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ABSTRACT. A number of theorists have touted the merits of the contextual approach to
political theory, arguing that a close examination of real-world cases is more likely to yield
both theoretical insight and practical solutions to pressing problems. This is particularly
evident, it is argued, in the field of multiculturalism in political theory. The present paper
offers some skeptical reflections on this view, arguing the merits of a view of political
theory which sees the contextual approach as less distinctive than its proponents imagine,
and less useful than many would suggest. It maintains that there are serious limits to what
political theorists can achieve, even if political theory is not without its uses if we value
social criticism.
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Is there such a thing as a contextual approach to political theory? Joseph
Carens for one thinks there is, for he devotes his paper to outlining its
virtues (as well as its deficiencies), and to arguing that its worth has been
underappreciated. And indeed, the very presence of this volume suggests
that contextualism in political theory is alive and well—or at least in tol-
erable health—since it is certainly being practiced, even if some do harbor
doubts about its promise when it comes to resolving pressing issues in
public debate. Nonetheless, I would like to offer some skeptical reflections
about the practice, and for that matter, about the very idea, of contextualism
in political theory.
Over the past 30 years, as political theorists have begun to engage more
and more with issues of public policy, there has emerged a growing sense
that political theory might do better if it came down from the hilltops to gain
a better appreciation of how life goes in particular communities, as they
confront questions not in the abstract but in the concrete. Certainly, political
theorists dealing with questions of multiculturalism seem to have taken this
lesson very much to heart as they have focused ever more sharply on con-
crete particulars (from problems of headscarves to questions of schooling
for religious minorities) rather than abstract principle. Much of the political
theory of multiculturalism seems to be of the contextual variety.
Nonetheless, I wish to suggest, contrary to this partly-received wisdom,
that the contextual approach is not a particularly distinctive approach in
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political theory; that to the extent that it is distinctive it is not particularly
theoretical; and that to the extent that it is theoretical it is not particularly
useful. To assert all of this, of course, may be to overstate my case. But
since that is precisely what theorists are supposed to do, in my view, this
is completely in keeping with the point I wish to make.
Let me say at the outset, however, first, that some of my best friends
are contextualists; and second, that none of what follows is intended to
disparage their contributions either to public debate or to our understanding
of the human condition more generally. My interest is not so much in saying
something about what we should be doing (or how we should be doing it) as
in saying something about what I think we are doing when we do political
theory. I will do this by commenting on the contributions to political theory
offered in this volume, though I begin with some more general reflections
about the nature of political theory.
1. WHAT DO POLITICAL THEORISTS DO?
Political theorists try to describe the political world, or aspects of it; or, to
the extent that they are normative theorists, try to describe what it should
look like if it conformed fully to particular values, such as a conception
of individual liberty, or a conception of community, or a view of human
rights, or a vision of justice. Sometimes they also assert that the world will
inevitably see the development of a particular kind of society, in which
certain values will become manifest, and there is no shortage of theories
of this type. Tocqueville, Hegel and Marx developed influential theories of
this kind in the nineteenth century, while Francis Fukuyama has developed
an interesting variant in the twentieth. But whether they offer historical
accounts or attend to normative questions about what kind of regime or
institutions or laws are desirable in a good political society, theorists dis-
tance themselves from what is actual. They view society from a distance.
Sometimes that distance is temporal, as they imagine some predicted future
state, or see in the present the development of ideas whose significance is
under-appreciated. On other occasions, the distance is philosophical and
imaginative as they envision a world in which one of the most striking
things about the human world has vanished: inconsistency.
What is the use of such an enterprise? Are political theorists at all useful?
It is tempting to be candid and admit at once that the answers to these
questions are: “none” and “no”. But these answers would be misleading
to the extent that they suggest that political theory is without point; and it
is not. Its point is precisely to bring us to a better understanding of those
values or ideals we often claim to cherish, or to which we appeal, or whose
claims we wish to assert in one context or another. Its point is to help us
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see better what the defense or assertion of particular values entails for our
various concerns—and indeed for the concerns of others. It helps us see
some ideas—and ideals—in relation to others. Political theory does this
because it is a theoretical enterprise, not because it is a practical one. In
fact, it is not a very practical enterprise at all. It may be useful in helping
us understand some things better; but except in the most indirect way, it
cannot be of any practical use in helping us decide how we should live.
The reason I say this is not because I wish to make a point about the
fact/value distinction, to suggest that about values no rational discussion is
possible. That is not my point. My point is rather that, in the actual world—
the political world—how we live is not only shaped by a single theory, but
also cannot be given concrete expression by a single theory. The reason, I
think, is not so much that all values are not perfectly compatible, as Isaiah
Berlin saw—though this seems true enough—than that we are a variable
and inconstant species who not only want different things, but also change
their minds. All too often we want, both individually and collectively,
different things that are mutually incompatible or unachievable. As life
has to go on, decisions are nonetheless taken about what is to be sought
or attempted or implemented. We are, unquestionably, a practical species.
Although theoretical reflection may sometimes precede practical action, it
is seldom more than just another input in the process that leads to decision.
Power, vanity, whimsy, inertia, and a shortage of time will also have their
influence. Reason has its part to play; but even to claim that it is primus
inter pares may be to claim too much for it.
In this way of viewing matters, the most that the theorist can do is help
us assess, and criticize, the claims of those who present their practical
proposals or solutions as theoretical products—as offerings possessing a
consistency with a range of desirable ends. But the theorist cannot take
us further—at least, not qua theorist. There is, of course, nothing to stop
a person who is a theorist from also being an advocate; but to the extent
that he is an advocate, he is not a theorist. Many advocates have turned out
really to be fine political theorists; and many political theorists have turned
out to be rather poor advocates.
Now all this in a way runs counter to Joseph Carens’s view that there
are many ways of doing political theory, one of which is what he calls the
contextual approach. There is much that I agree with in Carens’s account of
how political theory can be done. In particular, I agree with him about the
value of examples to illustrate theoretical formulations, about the impor-
tance of looking for examples that are challenging to one’s own position,
and about the virtue of looking at a wide range of cases, and of looking for
cases that are unfamiliar and illuminating because of their unfamiliarity.
But in the end, I wonder whether the root of this agreement lies in my ac-
ceptance of the contextualist approach which Carens recommends, or in the
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fact that many of his suggestions are sound even though what is presented
as distinctive of the contextual approach is really not distinctive at all.
In Carens’s account, examples are useful because, for one thing, they
“perform a crucial clarifying function for theory.” They do this even better,
he thinks, when they come from real cases rather than from the imagination
of the theorist adept at inventing hypothetical examples. “Real cases are
richer, more complex, and ultimately more illuminating.” But a number of
things need to be said here. First, the use of examples, even actual cases,
does not seem to be something particularly new, or a practice peculiar to
certain kinds of theorists. If we consider the history of modern political
theory, there is no shortage of thinkers, from Vitoria and Grotius to David
Hume and John Stuart Mill to F.A. Hayek and Ronald Dworkin , who draw
on real examples to illustrate or clarify philosophical points. All (except,
perhaps, Hume whose approach to philosophy is in important ways different
from these others) wished to defend abstract principles, but also thought it
necessary to discuss real cases to do so.
Second, real world examples also have serious disadvantages for the
theorist precisely because they are rich and complex. This sometimes makes
them less a source of illumination than a cause of confusion. For example,
if we consider the problem of rectification of past injustice in the case of
aboriginal peoples whose ancestors were dispossessed, real cases often do
not help the theorist trying to establish a general principle because actual
circumstances reveal how great is the range of considerations that come into
play. Some theorists have in fact concluded that so complex are these cases
that the very idea of trying to address historical injustice is implausible,
and normative theory, and public policy, should simply look forward—and
not backward—when trying to assess claims of justice. It is not surprising
that theorists sometimes invent hypothetical examples and illustrate their
principles instead of drawing on real cases.
Now, it might be argued that this is precisely the point of contextualism:
to force (or at least encourage) theorists to “explore actual cases where the
fundamental concerns of the theory are in play”. This would sure be all
to the good? Yet once again I am inclined to ask: is this so far from what
most theorists do? And to the extent that it is not, is there not good reason
for it? Let me explain. Although a lot of academic political theorizing
takes off from abstract theoretical puzzles in the literature, much of it
really has its roots in a concern with issues or questions generated by
political life. Much theoretical modern reflection on political obligation has
its roots in public debates about the justifiability of civil disobedience ,when
governments pursue foreign policies that are questionable. A good deal
of American debate about equality has its origins in modern discussions
about how to redress injustices caused by slavery and perpetuated by laws
and institutions that discriminated against African Americans. In these
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cases, debate has begun with the exploration of concrete issues, but as
participants in the debate have been pressed to explain why one proposal
or another truly meets the right standard of justice, or equality, or freedom,
or respect for individual rights, so have they been forced to come up with
independent reasons or arguments why their theories are more coherent
and more attractive than hitherto recognized. This has necessarily forced
such participants away from the task of exploring issues in the concrete;
but it has not in any way made their contributions less pertinent to the
understanding of those issues which gave rise to abstract exploration in
the first place. To be sure, theorists can sometimes become so engrossed
in their constructions and the demands of philosophical consistency, that
they end up creating theories and vocabularies that simply fail to connect
with anything we might recognize as the real world. This is certainly a
danger one should guard against, just as one should guard against the fear
of making any generalization because every case is, in some way, different
from every other.
My general point here is that contextualism, as Joseph Carens has pre-
sented it, seems right to the extent that it offers us some commonsensical
suggestions about how to do political theory well, but wrong to the extent
that it is offered as a distinctive approach. But this is all by way of prole-
gomenon to my larger point: that while abstraction has its virtues, practical
utility is not one of them. Let me turn to this matter, which I will address
through some reflections on the other papers in this volume.
2. THE VIRTUE OF ABSTRACTION
For some, even the advance (or is it a retreat?) to contextualism is not
enough. Theory must not only operate within its context but also work with
a greater appreciation of the social dimensions of the theorizing process
itself.
This seems to be the nub of Jan van der Stoep’s complaint against Carens,
and also against the theorizing of Rawls, Habermas, and others. We need
to acknowledge not only the cultural condition of minorities struggling for
rights and recognition, and the particular nature of their needs, but also the
disadvantages under which they labor because they cannot readily speak
up as equals when the mode of discourse that dominates thinking and dis-
cussion itself biases matters in a particular way. In van der Stoep’s view,
even a theorist like Michael Walzer, who is wellknown for his criticisms of
abstract philosophizing, is held “insufficiently aware of the fact that differ-
ences in wealth, language of competences, social networks and education
cause unequal control over the production and reproduction of public opin-
ion”. This is revealed in Walzer’s appeal to the will of the people to resolve
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disputes in moral reasoning, when in fact this appeal amounts to just an-
other illustration of the arbitrariness of moral reason. All discourse seems
to be tarnished.
For van der Stoep, even contextualist philosophers such as Kymlicka,
Carens and Charles Taylor, no less than Walzer, have failed to appreciate
that “group identities, social institutions and public ethos are closely linked
with class positions, power relationships, stigmatization and socialization.”
In this account, the answer is to take on board some lessons to be drawn from
Bourdieu, and push contextual moral philosophy in a more sociological
direction.
I must confess that I do not understand what precisely this recommen-
dation amounts to. Van der Stoep suggests that we must recognize that in
the public sphere, strategic and communicative action are thoroughly en-
tangled with each other, and that we need to understand the complex and
often obscure motives and reasons of peoples. But why exactly we should
take this sociological turn is unclear. In the end, it is perfectly true to say
that not only institutions but also agents and arguments are shaped by the
interests and powers that have influenced the development of everything.
Liberal academics do indeed operate with particular social and cultural
biases—no less than do other scholars or writers. We ignore this fact about
society and about ourselves at our peril. But it is no less perilous to make too
much of this; for, taken too far, a preoccupation with hidden motives and
the underlying structure of power can be completely debilitating, making
it impossible to say or do anything. What then is to be done?
Two things need to be done. The first, less important, thing is that
we present our arguments with an awareness that others may well chal-
lenge them as unconvincing because they are simply particularistic or self-
interested claims masquerading as general propositions. Second, and far
more importantly, we do what we can to sustain a regime under which crit-
icism is possible—indeed, encouraged. If criticism is not possible because
it is suppressed masqueraders can never be unmasked.
This point about the importance of criticism is quite commonplace, and
I claim no originality for it. It has been made again and again by writers
of all kinds of philosophical disposition—and clearly it is a point with
which van der Stoep and Bourdieu, no less than Rawls and Kymlicka
would have considerable sympathy. But we should note one important
thing about the very point of a regime of criticism. What it does is to
enable—dare I say, empower—everyone within it to put forward claims,
theoretical or otherwise, without having to go through the most elaborate
self-examination to demonstrate that such claims are free of hidden motives,
or that they are not the product of a person beholden to particular powers,
or shaped by a particular history. They are empowered to do this because
it is clear that under a regime of criticism there is a strong possibility
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of being unmasked, and there is no point wasting time protesting about
one’s credentials. If one’s arguments are self-serving, the chances are that
someone will say so, and show so.
If we do live under a regime of freedom of criticism, I suggest that, what
we do is to present our theories without too much reflection on their ge-
nealogies or on our own deeper motives. Present them as objective claims,
and challenge the world to show that they are not coherent, or that they
serve only particular interests, or are merely the product of a particular cul-
tural or social milieu. The onus will then be on the critic to say something
critical—and something more interesting and challenging than the mun-
dane observation that everything is the product of a particular social milieu.
To be sure, in the public sphere “strategic and communicative action are
thoroughly entangled with each other”. The ultimate point, however, is not
to try to disentangle it, or detect hidden reasons and motives. The point is
to examine and consider the claims that are being communicated. If they
are merely self-interested, they should be criticized as such and rejected. If
they are self-interested but nonetheless defensible, they should be accepted.
This brings me to the more general point I wish to make. One important
way of proceeding when matters are in dispute, and when the disputants
come from different perspectives or have different interests, is to try to find
some principles or perspectives that abstract from particular attachments
and have more general, or possibly universal, applicability. When we dis-
agree about concrete issues we seek a little critical distance, hoping that
even if we cannot see things from the point of view of those with whom
we disagree , we might be able to see matters from a perspective that is not
peculiarly our own. We try to abstract from our own concerns and put for-
ward arguments or theories, or simply accounts that we think might appeal
to others more generally. In doing this we in effect say to others: we need to
take matters out of context, at least for a while, because what characterizes
the context is disagreement. We need, to put it another way, to find some
common ground from which we can begin discussion anew, perhaps so as
to make some progress.
The point of this move, however, is to be able to say when some abstract
matter is agreed upon: good; and this case is precisely analogous to the
matter we were debating before we decided to abstract from it. Of course,
this is never straightforward. Even those convinced by arguments of abstract
principle will often hesitate when confronted by the possibility that they
would have to review the commitments they defended before the resort to
abstraction. But this problem cannot be avoided.
Nor can we avoid the process of abstraction. Political theory is, above
all, about abstraction, for it is about abstracting from the particular and the
concrete to establish what holds more generally. The reason it is of this
nature is that political theory is born of the realization that, if the many
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are to live together, each cannot claim that his own perspective on the
world, and on the way collective life is best organized, is the one all should
accept for no other reason than that it is his. Political theory’s development
bespeaks a realization that even the fact that some, or many, hold to a
particular perspective does not settle matters or establish that one way of
doing things is better than others. Political theory is, at least in part, an
effort to escape the tyranny of context.
In this regard, Paul van den Berg’s attempt to begin to develop a ‘con-
textual ethics of cultural identity’ is of special interest. On the one hand,
his paper ‘Be prestige-resilient’ is concerned to examine the nature of cul-
tural identity by exploring its manifestation in a particular context. Only a
fine-grained analysis of behaviours at the local level is capable of yielding
the insights he offers into the shape of identities that are created in the
interaction of immigrants from different cultures. Yet on the other hand
it is worth remarking that, in this analysis, the insight is generated by the
development of abstract concepts to describe or account for what is seen.
The crucial notion here is ‘prestige-resilience’, which in van den Berg’s
hands is used to draw comparisons between different cultural groups and
persons, and so to identify features of the world that might otherwise be
missed—not because they are not “seen” but because they are not noticed.
For political theorists, or social theorists more generally, to generate
insights they must often abandon contexts and look for conceptual tools that
allow them to look at contexts in a fresh light. In many, if not most, cases,
this means looking at the world from a distance, perhaps with altogether
different lenses than the ones favoured by those operating close to their
subjects.
3. THE TROUBLE WITH ABSTRACTION
While abstraction is an important, and inevitable, part of any kind of dis-
course, however, it suffers from significant limitations. One of these is
that in most forms of public discourse, as Marcel Maussen notes, “norma-
tive considerations exist alongside other considerations”. Indeed, Maussen,
echoing sentiments expressed by Bhikhu Parekh, suggests that perhaps
“theorists should stop inventing ideal models in the abstract” and start
studying the real dilemmas multicultural societies have faced. There is
much in this complaint that is important, and it is important to recognize
the limitations of the process of abstraction. What I want to do now is ac-
knowledge the limitations of theory, though this does not mean at all that
theorists should stop inventing ideal models. Unfortunately, theorists, qua
theorists, are not good for much else. The problem with political theory,
insofar as it attempts to say something about public policy, and particularly
CONTEXTUALISM RECONSIDERED 223
when it looks to make recommendations about public policy, is that public
policy takes very little account of political theory. Public policy, particularly
in democratic states, is the outcome of public interaction among interested
persons and groups. These persons and groups are “interested” both in the
sense that they may be not “disinterested” and also not “uninterested”. To
put it another way, they may be interested because they are themselves
affected by the outcome, or they may be interested because they are not
impartial observers, but care (say, for ethical or ideological reasons) about
the kind of policy that is made. When policy is made numerous kinds of
considerations may therefore turn out to be pertinent: is the policy feasible
(say, in the sense of ‘affordable’)?; is it consistent with other laws?; will it
offend some communities?; is it fair (to current or to later generations)?;
will it worsen relations between communities, or provoke public disorder?;
is it just?; will it put powerful groups offside and make other public policies
more difficult to pursue?; what will it symbolize?; and what effect will it
have on the loyalties of the members of different political parties?
On only a few of these questions might a political theorist have anything
of any interest to contribute. In the making of public policy, abstract theory
is a good with very little cash value. This is not to say that argument is not
important. Far from it, as Marcel Maussen’s study of “Normative Theory
and Policy Discourses on the Establishment of Mosques in the Netherlands”
makes clear. Argument, debate, and the analysis of meaning are central to
the process of policy-formation, if we consider the issue of the establish-
ment of mosques in Rotterdam. Maussen’s paper demonstrates clearly how
complex is the network of issues and debates that surround the question
of mosque establishment. It is not simply a matter of determining whether
to allow the construction of a house of worship or where to permit them
on the basis of abstract considerations of freedom of religion or national
identity. Questions of urban planning contend with issues of symbolism
and “community representation” as authorities attempt to work out how
to serve the city and its diverse inhabitants, including particular interests
pressing for recognition. But while argument is central to the process of
establishing policy, abstract theory has a relatively small part to play—if,
indeed, it has any part to play at all in this instance.
My suggestion, which may in the end be an unwelcome one in the
academy, is that the political theorist is by and large not really welcome
in public discourse when he speaks as a theorist. People immersed in the
politics of an issue are not altogether interested in abstract theories or
conceptual analysis. They have little time for the recommendations of those
who are above the fray and are able to look with a skeptical eye at the goings-
on below. All too often, they are more interested in whether outsiders are
willing to enter the fray—and on their side. But this is precisely what the
theorist does not do to the extent that he remains a theorist, rather than an
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advocate for one view or another. This does not mean that an advocate for a
position can never do so on the basis of a sound theoretical understanding.
But it is not common, and his success as an advocate in no way depends
upon theoretical sophistication. The more the theorist is a theorist, the less
useful he is in political life. He is about as welcome there as an ethno-
musicologist at a jazz festival.
4. CONTEXTUALITY ONCE MORE
Yet perhaps all this is overstating matters. The contextualist’s claims, it
might be argued, are more modest than this, for all contextualism asserts
is that fine-grained analysis of particular issues from a perspective that is
close to the problem at hand might yield better insights and even practical
solutions than reflection from afar. This is the claim of Eric Mitnick, who
recommends a contextual or “constitutive” approach as one which adopts
“a less instrumental, less linear, more complex and multidirectional, view
of social causality.” In particular, he contends that “adopting a constitutive
and contextual approach will enable us better to appreciate and evaluate
the moral issues raised by differentiated citizenship policies.”
While there is no doubt that a change of perspective or of theoretical
emphasis can lead to different conclusions, however, it is not clear that
the adoption of a contextual approach leads to the improved understanding
Mitnick anticipates. His point in “Differentiated Citizenship and Contex-
tualized Morality” is that approaches such as that of liberal theorists like
Brian Barry, emphasizing as they do the virtues of formal equality, are un-
able to appreciate certain subtle virtues of differentiated citizenship which
are likely to be lost if formal equality is imposed. While equality might
benefit some persons who are subordinated by the law by enhancing their
capacity for self-invention, formal equality might harm other groups seek-
ing accommodation of unpopular practices by making them sacrifice that
capacity. Serving both groups may require differentiated citizenship. And
only a contextual approach is likely to bring us to an appreciation of this.
The lesson to be learned here, Mitnick avers, is that we should be less
enamoured of “satisfyingly tidy solutions to critical questions”. Contextual
approaches will yield complicated inferences and provisional results rather
than order and certainty. And, in the end, not only must logic submit to
the corrective of fact but also political theory must make a place for the
nonideal, the historically contingent, the concrete. Contextual theory will
give us untidier solutions, but they will be better theories for that.
Paradoxically, perhaps, I think this is mistaken because it has an unre-
alistic view of what theory can accomplish both practically and analyti-
cally. I have already suggested why I think political theory can make little
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contribution to practical life. Let me now suggest that there is a serious
limit to what theory can do to present political life, as it is or as it might
be, in a single construction that serves a wide range of divergent values.
What political theorists can do is offer a critique of existing or proposed
arrangements from the perspective of one particular mix of values—say,
for example, a theory of equality—and show systematically how those ar-
rangements are inconsistent with that mix of values or that ideal. In reality,
however, any existing society and its members are going to reject not only
the recommended theory but also even the demand of consistency. Societies
are going to change policy, or adopt contradictory ones, or serve particular
interests for a time and others at another. The virtue of theory is not that it
brings order into practice, for it does not. Nor is it that it will fully describe
practice, for practice is too full of contingency to be properly captured.
Theory’s virtue is that it provides a lens through which to view the world,
so that we might better understand what is constant and what is variable,
and so we can better understand what must be sacrificed if some things
are to be gained—so that we can better appreciate why all things are not
possible.
In this respect, it seems to me, the move toward contextualism does
not promise better theory. There may be good reason sometimes to look
at matters up close rather than from a distance. But this is, in the end,
an anti-theoretical move. There are times when it may pay us to be less
theoretically inclined, but not because this will give us better theory.
In this regard, I think the lessons drawn by Odile Verhaar and Sawitri
Saharso are salutary. In their examination of the issue of headscarves in
Holland they concluded that that contextual approaches to discourse did
not result in any greater convergence of different positions. Nor did it yield
conclusions that were more open to the claims of minority culture. And
in the end, it seems that the contextual approach, to the extent that it was
at all distinctive, came with the disadvantage that it made social criticism
more difficult, since it pushed discussion inwards, suggesting that matters
should be left to be argued out by those who belonged to the context.
To be a social critic one must, in the end, step out of the context and pro-
claim one’s independence. The theorist is not the only one who is capable
of this. But at least that is the one thing the theorist is good for.
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